Roles
External chain
Intention
Bridge contractholds custody · verifies signatures before releasing anythingthe piece a user’s funds actually depend on
Validatorsobserve the external chain and sign what they see
Finalizera relay, not an authority — it cannot create a withdrawal validators did not sign
Governorvalidator set and parameters — what cannot be automated safely
A withdrawal is only actionable once enough validator signatures are aggregated — the same trust assumption as consensus, applied across a chain boundary.
deposit events
aggregated signatures
withdrawal transactions
Deposits
A deposit is the easy direction. Funds are locked in the external contract, which emits a deposit event; validators observe it, and the credit becomes a protocol-native transaction on Intention. Because that credit is an ordinary transaction, it inherits everything the kernel guarantees. It executes in canonical order, its effect on the account is attributed to it, and it is visible in the same output as any other state change. A deposit that restores margin on a position near liquidation is visible to the Clearinghouse in the same execution step — not in a later reconciliation. The waiting is on the external chain’s finality, not on Intention. A deposit is credited when the source chain’s confirmation requirement is met.Withdrawals
A withdrawal is the dangerous direction, and it runs in two phases with a dispute period between them.Requested on Intention
Signed by validators, registered on the contractit does not pay out
Dispute perioda configured window must elapse
Finalizedfunds released
Invalidatedcancelled before anything moves
Why it waitsEvery catastrophic bridge failure has the same structure: an attacker obtains the ability to authorize a withdrawal, and the funds are gone in the same block. A dispute period converts an instant, irreversible loss into a window in which monitoring and humans can act. The cost is that legitimate withdrawals wait too.
elapsed
disputed
Stopping it
Two mechanisms exist for when something is wrong. Invalidation cancels a specific withdrawal inside its dispute period. It is the targeted response. Locking is the blunt one: a designated role can lock the bridge, and the number of such parties required to act is itself a parameter. This is the mechanism for “something is wrong and we do not yet know what” — it stops the flow rather than adjudicating individual transactions.Validator set changes
The external contract has to know who the validators are, which means validator set changes must propagate across the boundary. They are proposed and then finalized as a separate step, rather than taking effect the moment they are submitted — the same two-phase shape as withdrawals, for the same reason.Where the risk actually sits
Worth stating plainly, because bridges are where users lose money:- On Intention, the bridge is ordinary. A credited deposit is a normal transaction with normal guarantees.
- On the external chain, you depend on the contract and the signature threshold. That is a different security model from consensus, and it is audited separately — the bridge is the component under third-party review.
- In between, you depend on validators observing correctly and on the finalizer submitting. Neither can fabricate a withdrawal; both can delay one.
Where to go next
Deposit funds
The user-facing path in, with current chains and timings.
Non-trading fees
What a withdrawal costs, and why deposits are free.
Clearinghouse
What a deposit does to margin the moment it lands.
Risk disclosures
Bridge trust assumptions stated as risks.