Observation
Each validator subscribes to a set of external venues for each tracked instrument, drawn from a governance-maintained allowlist. A venue on the list may produce prices that count toward validator observations; a venue off the list may not. A venue-diversity requirement at the protocol level obliges each validator to draw observations for a given instrument from multiple independent venues. No single upstream failure can corrupt a validator’s local observation. When preparing to vote on or propose a block, a validator produces a signed observation record carrying its identity, the current round, its observed prices, and its signature.Stake-weighted median with MAD outlier rejection
Intention aggregates validator price observations using a stake-weighted median with median-absolute-deviation (MAD) outlier rejection. The aggregation is deterministic, verifiable, and produces a single canonical value per instrument per round. The procedure:- Collect observations from at least stake-weighted validators.
- Compute the stake-weighted median to obtain an initial estimate.
- Compute the median absolute deviation from that estimate as a robust scale measure.
- Reject observations whose deviation exceeds a protocol-fixed multiple of the MAD.
- Recompute the stake-weighted median on the retained observations.
MAD is a robust statistic: it tolerates a large fraction of outliers without being pulled by them. Combined with the stake-weighted median — which tolerates up to of the total stake being Byzantine — this gives the aggregation a well-understood robustness profile.
The error bound
Under the fault threshold, honest stake strictly exceeds and therefore dominates any stake-weighted median. A Byzantine coalition holding up to stake cannot move the stake-weighted median outside the range of honest validator observations. The MAD filter cannot be manipulated to eject honest minorities while the honest majority holds more than . The precise statement: assuming honest observations lie within a band of half-width around the true price, the adversarial post-MAD aggregate lies within a band of half-width for a protocol-bounded constant that depends on the MAD multiplier. The error is bounded by construction, not by good-faith operator behavior.In-consensus certification
After computing the aggregate, the block leader combines it with an aggregate signature over the contributing validators’ observations to form a price quorum certificate, identifying which validators contributed via a stake bitmap. The price quorum is embedded in the block proposal so that it is covered by the block hash and, therefore, by the signatures that commit the block. When validators verify a block proposal in the prepare phase, they check:- The aggregate signature is valid for the claimed contributors.
- The combined stake of contributors strictly exceeds .
- The aggregate is the correct output of the aggregation rule applied to the contained observations.
- The observations are recent within a protocol-defined staleness bound.
- The leader’s own observations are consistent (within MAD bounds) with the aggregate — a sanity check that prevents a faulty leader from fabricating contributions.